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A question is presented to the people of the United States, of
more interest and importance than any which has arisen since the
Constitution was adopted. There are now confined in the fortresses
of the Nation a large number of what may properly be called State
prisoners. They have been arrested by military power, and are
held in custody without any civil process. When the commanders
of these forces are served with a writ of habeas corpus, they refuse
to comply with it, by direction of the President. The question,
therefore, is, are these prisoners lawfully confined, or is it a gross
outrage upon their rights of personal liberty? Many persons, even
in the States which are still loyal, charge the President with usurpation. Many loyal citizens, though acquiescing in the proceeding as
a matter of necessity, still doubt its constitutionality. As the country is now struggling to sustain the Constitution, it is of the utmost
importance to demonstrate, as it is believed mnay be done, that the
measures adopted by the Government are strictly within the powers
conferred by that instrument. The precise point has never been decided by the court of last resort. But in the case of ex joarte Merryman, Ch. J. Taney, in an opinion published in the July number of the
Register, decided that, in the arrest of Merryman, the President
acted without constitutional authority. The high position occupied
by this jurist renders this opinion, in the minds of some, conclusive.
VOL. IX.-45

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

On the other hand, the Attorney General has given to Congress an
official opinion, in which he clearly justifies the arrest of Merryman,
and all others who, in the opinion of the President, are implicated
in the rebellion. In support of this view is the unanimous concurrence of the Cabinet, composed of men, many of whom are eminent
lawyers, who would not disgrace a position on the bench of the
Supreme Court. The Attorney General holds the same position
now as the Chief Justice did before his elevation to the bench, and
is believed by many to be fully as well qualified for the office.
Other distinguished jurists have volunteered opinions on one side or
the other. The weight of authority would seem to be, therefore,
strongly in favor of the President.
An attempt will now be made to show that the power of the
President to do what he has done, is clearly inferrable from the
Constitution and the existing laws of Congress; that this view of
the subject has been fully sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the
United States, and that the Chief Justice himself has advanced
propositions that are utterly inconsistent with his decision in the
Merryman case, and with the doctrines contained in it.
I. The clauses in the Constitution bearing upon the question are
the following:ART. 1,Sxc. 9.-" The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may
require it."
ART. 2, SEa. 2.-" The President shall be Commander in-chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into
the actual service of the United States."
ART. 2, Sxo. 3.-" He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
ART. 6.-"All executive officers-of the United States-shall be bound, by oath
or affirmation, to support this Constitution."
AMENDmENrs, ART. 5.-"No persons shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service."
LAw or 1795.-" Whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the
execution thereof obstructed by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the Marshals in
this act, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the
militia of such State, or any other State or States, as may be necessary to suppress
such combination, and to cause the laws to be executed."
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No unprejudiced mind can fail to discover from each and all of
these provisions, that the framers of the Constitution, and the Congress which was held a few years afterwards, contemplated a state
of things in which civil proceedings must necessarily be superseded
by military operations. Military force is to be used because civil
process has become ineffectual. It becomes not only the right, but
the duty of the President, to call out and use the militia. He is
bound by oath to do it. But the right to use this extraordinary
power commences when, and not before, the ordinary safeguards of
life, liberty and property become ineffectual. This is sometimes
called suspending the writ of habeas corpus; but it is a misapplication of language.
The writ has been suspended, if that term is applicable, and the
privilege lost, before the President begins to act. How can there
be any privilege of habeas corpus when the only officers, judicial or
executive, who have anything to do with the writ, either dare not
act, or, through treason or rebellion, will not? The right to use
military force gives, of course, the right to dispense with civil proceedings. The two forces are totally unlike, and proceed by totally
different means. What has a General to do with a bench warrant,
and who ever heard of such an officer rendering an account of his
conduct to a Judge? The President is commander-in-chief of the
army and navy, and what is he to command them to do? Plainly,
nothing but to kill or to capture. If his soldiers kill, are they to
be tried for murder on an indictment? *If they capture, are they
to answer to a charge of false imprisonment? The bare suggestion
is enough to show the absurdity of subh a claim. It is clear, then,
that, granting to the President the right to employ a military force,
is, per se, authorizing him to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, if
that term can properly be applied to such a state of things as presupposes the absence of any such writ, and the inability on the
part of those claiming the privilege, to use it. It is urged that the
Constitution vests this power only in the legislative department.
The justness of this claim will be considered hereafter. But suppose it to be correct. The Legislature has vested the power in the
President by the law of 1795, above quoted. If, then, there was- a
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combination in Maryland too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, and Merryman was implicated
in it, the President was explicitly authorized by Congress to arrest
him by military force, and to hold him as a captive.
But the President had this power without the act of Congress.
This is clearly to be inferred from several of the clauses which have
been referred to, and particularly that which provides that "the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless
when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety shall
require it.
The Attorney General has well remarked that "the Constitution
is older than the Judiciary Act." It existed before there were any
Judges who could issue a -writ of habeas corpus. There was a
President before there was or could be any act suspending the privilegQ of such a writ. There was a time, therefore, in which a rebellion might have taken place, when, if the President had not had the
power of arresting the rebels, the Government might have been
destroyed. It is not to be presumed that the authors of the Constitution intended to leave the country so exposed.
Where the Constitution provides that the writ shall not be suspended except under certain circumstances, and does not say by
whom, the fair inference is, that it refers to those who, for the time
being, have the power'bf violating it. It establishes three co-ordinate branches of the Government: the Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial. Why should it be supposed to refer to the Legislative
alone? Congress is not in session, on an average, more than onethird of the time. The suspension of the writ is only to take place
on a sudden and unexpected emergency, and then as a measure of
necessity, to preserve the Government. Such an emergency is
twice as likely to occur when Congress is not in session as when it
is. Yet it is contended, although the very existence of the
Government may depend on the suspension of the writ, that no
way is provided by the Constitution for its own preservation.
Judges of the Supr9me Court have frequently eulogized the sagacity
and wisdom of the authors of the Constitution. If such a construction is correct, it does indeed show their sagacity, for the language
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proves that they foresaw the danger, but at the same time convicts
them of the grossest folly, in not guarding against it. We ought
not, therefore, to limit the clause in question to the legislative department unless the reasons for it are conclusive.
But judging from the provisions of the Constitution alone, if the
power of suspending the writ is to be restricted to any one department alone, it would naturally be referred to the Executive. It has
already been suggested that this department has, for the exercise of
power, twice as much time as the Legislative. It is the most active,
and is much more likely to come in collision with the personal rights
of individuals. The clause in question limits the suspension of the
writ to occasions of insurrection and invasion, and it is in times of insurrection and invasion that the military force is to be called out,
and put under the control of the Executive. This is certainly a
remarkable coincidence; it is virtually saying, that in times of insurrection and invasion the President shall be invested with military power, and then the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended.
If it is asked, by whom? the answer is obvious, and the reply would
be almost unanimous, "by the President."
But the Chief Justice insists that, although there is not the slightest reference to Congress in the clause in question, yet that it must
be regarded as referring to that body alone, because he says that it
is found in the first article of the Constitution, and this article "is
devoted to the Legislative Department of the United States, and
has not the slightest reference to the Executive Department." So
far as his opinion is based on the construction of the Constitution,
it rests almost entirely on this assumption. If, then, this assertion
is erroneous, the whole argument falls to the ground.
A careful examination of the first article will show, beyond a
doubt, that it is not confined to the Legislative Department, and
that it does in one instance at least refer to the Executive, whereas
the whole force of the argument depends upon the exclusiveness of
the reference. It does, indeed, treat chiefly of the Legislative Department. But the first clause of section ten of that article is
wholly devoted to the prohibition of action in certain cases by the
State Governments, and has no reference to Congress. One clause
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of Section nine, of the first article, standing in it very near to the
clause in question, is in these words:"No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence
of appropriations made by law." Now which department draws
money from the Treasury? The Executive, without doubt. To
say that Congress shall not draw money from the Treasury without
an appropriation, would be to say that Congress shall not make an
appropriation without an appropriation, for .an act appropriating
money is all that it is capable of doing. Here, then, is a clause, in
the same section with the one regarding the suspension of habeas
corpus, referring, notwithstanding the assertion of the Chief Justice to the contrary, directly to the Executive. Why, then, may not
that clause refer to the same department ? How illogical to conclude that it does not.
An inference may be drawn in favor of this power of the Presi.dent, with almost equal clearness, from those clauses which require
him to see that the laws are faithfully executed, and that he shall
take an oath to support the Constitution. The imposition of this
duty necessarily carries with it the right to use whatever means are
appropriate and necessary to accomplish this object. This rule is
always applied in the construction of powers. The Supreme Court
has held, over and over again, that the power to do an act necessarily includes the power to use the appropriate means to do it.
Marshall, C. J., says: "The powers given to the Government imply
the ordinary means of execution, and the Government, in all sound
reason and fair interpretation, must have the choice of the means it
deems the most convenient and appropriate to the execution of the
power." 4 Wheat. 816; 1 Kent, 252. This doctrine is asserted by
that eminent jurist, to apply to the Government, which consists of
the Executive, as well as Legislative and Judicial departments.
On this ground a great many Acts of Congress have been held to
be constitutional, although no explicit power has been given. No
good reason can be assigned why it should not be applied to
the Executive. If the President plainly sees that he cannot support the Constitution without arresting a rebel, who will otherwise
destroy it, is he to do nothing, and witness the loss of that which it
is his sworn duty to save?
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II. It will next be shown that the Supreme Court of the United
States has decided, in a case precisely analogous, that the President has the power to do all that he has done in this case. This
was the case of Luther vs. Borden, 7 How. 1. An attempt was made
to revolutionize the State Government in Rhode Island by what was"
called the Dorr Rebellion. The regular State Legislature declared
the whole State under martial law. The State Government, with
the assent of the President of the United States, authorized the
defendants, as a part of the militia of the State, to break the house
of the plaintiff, and arrest him as a rebel. They broke the house,
but did not find him; and for this he sued the defendants. TheSupreme Court held the defendants justified under this authority of
the President. If Luther had been arrested and held in custody,
he would have been in the same situation as Merryman. The right
to break the house depended entirely on the right to make the
arrest. The constitutional and legal authority of the President
was merely an extension of the power which he has to suppress
insurrection against the General Government, so as to make it
apply to insurrections against State Governments. Whatever measures he could adopt with regard to the latter, he could afortioriuse
as to the former. Chief Justice Taney himself, in giving the decision
of the Court, (7 How. 44,) says: "A similar question arose in the
case of Martin vs. Wheat. 12 Wheat. 29. 'The first clause of the
first section of the Act of February 28, 1795, authorizes the President to call out the militia to repel invasion. It is the second clause
of the same section which authorizes the call to suppress insurrection against a State Government. The power given to the President in each case is the same, with this difference only, that it cannot be exercised by him in the latter case except upon the application of the Legislature or Executive of the State." Again, he says,
(7 How. 44,) "It is true that in this case the militia were not
called out by the President; but upon the application of the Governor, under the Charter Government, the President recognized
him as the executive power of the State, and took measures to call
out the militia to support his authority, if it should be found necessary for the General Government to interfere; and it is admitted
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in the argument that it was the knowledge of this decision that put
an end to the armed opposition to the Charter Government, and
prevented any further efforts to establish by force the proposed
Constitution. The interference of the President, therefore, by announcing his determination, was as effectual as if the militia had
been assembled under his orders, and it should be equally auithoritative."
It is clear, then, that in this case the Court held that where there is
an insurrection in a State, against the State Government, the President has the right to authorize the'use of military force to arrest, without any civil process whatever, any person found in armed opposition to such Government, or aiding or abetting in the insurrection.
If this is suspending the writ of habeas corpus, then the Court held
directly that the President has such a right, by force of the Constitution and the Law of 1795.
In the same case, the Court also held that the President was the
sole judge whether an insurrection existed, and whether the person
arrested was implicated in it; and that his decision cannot be
revised by a civil tribunal. Ch. J. Taney, (7 How. p. 43,) in giving the decision of the Court, quotes with approbation the language
of his predecessor, in .Martinvs. Mott, 12 Wheat. 29: "Wherever
a statute gives discretionary power to any person, to be exercised
by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of
construction, that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive
judge of the existence of those facts." Again he says, (7 How. p.43,)
"After the President has acted, and called out the militia, is a
Circuit Court of the United States authorized to inquire whether
his decision is right ?" "Could the Court, while the parties were
actually contending in arms for the possession of the Government,
call witnesses before it to inquire which party represented a majority
of the people? If it could, then it would become the duty of the
Court (provided it came to the conclusion that the President had
decided incorrectly) to discharge those who were arrested or distrained byi the troops in the service of the United States, or the
Government which the President was endeavoring to maintain. If
the judicial power extends so far, the guarantee contained in the
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Constitution of the United States, (alluding to the guarantee to
each State against domestic violence) is a guarantee of anarchy,
and not of order." Again, be says: "By this act, (the Act of
1795,) the power of deciding whether the exigency had arisen upon
which the Government of the United States is bound to interfere,
is given to the President." The same doctrine has been repeatedly
held by the same Court. 9 How. 615; 16 How. 189.
It is clear, then, that if Luther had been actually arrested and
detained, and had applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of
habeas corpus, although the circumstances would have maide the
case more doubtful than Merryman's, the Court would have said it
had no power to interfere.
III. It remains now to show that the doctrines advanced by the
Chief Justice in the Merryman case, are wholly irreconcilable not
only with the decision in the Borden case, but vith his own
opinions as expressed in giving the decision of the Court in that
case. On page 530, Am. Law Reg., vol. 9, he says: "With such
provisions in the- Constitution, expressed in language too clear to
be misunderstood by any one, I can see no ground whatever for
supposing that the President, in any emergency, or in any state of
things, can authorize the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, or arrest a citizen except in aid of the judicial
power." How can this be reconciled vith what the Chief Justice
said in the Borden case? There the question was distinctly put to
him, can the President, to suppress an insurrection, authorize a
military officer, directly and not in aid of any civil process, to break
open the dwelling-house of an insurgent, and arrest him ? He answers, unhesitatingly, Yes. In Merryman's case the same question
precisely is put to him, and he says No. There is not a shade of
difference between the two cases, except that in one the rebellion
was against the State Government, and the other against the United
States Government. In the Rhode Island case, it is true, martial law
had been proclaimed. But the Chief Justice says, 4 How. 44, "In
relation to the Act of the Legislature, declaring martial law, it is not
necessary, in the case before us, to inquire to what extent, nor
under what circumstances, that power may be exercised by a
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State." So that that circumstance made no difference between
the cases.
On the same page, 580 Am. Law Reg., the Chief Justice says:
"Nor can any argument be drawn from the nature of sovereignty, or
the necessities of government, for self-defence in times of tumult and
danger. The Government of the United States is one of limited
powers." Yet in the Borden case, 7 How. 45, he says: "Unquestionably, a State may use its military power to put down an armed insurrection, too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The power
is essential to the existence of EVERY Government, essential to the
preservation of order and free institutions." A similar comparison
of other expressions used by the same Judge in the two cases, will
show their utter inconsistency, not only in language, but in spirit.
In the Merryman case, the Chief Justice treats the question as
one involving merely the right of the President to act without the
authority of Congress, and does not even allude to the law of 1795,
although this Act was just as applicable in this as it was in the
Borden case, while in the Borden case he considers the Act of 1795
as conferring full authority upon him to do exactly what was done
in the Merryman case.
To sustain the proposition that the President has no power of
himself to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, the Chief Justice
quotes largely from the dicta of English jurists. But these are
entitled to but little consideration, as the question turns mainly on
the construction of the Constitution of the United States. He
quotes also a remark of Judge Marshall; but the case in which it
was made did not bring to the attention of the Court, in the slightest degree, the point whether the power of suspending the writ of
habeas corpus is vested in the Legislative department alone, and
not in the Executive department, under any circumstances. The
observation of Judge Story to which he refers, shows that it was a
matter of uncertainty with him. These authorities are referred to
to show that the President, of himself, has not the power, by the
Constitution, to suspend the writ of habeas corpus; but this was
not the question. It was, whether the Constitution, and the Law
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of 1795, vested this power in the Presiden4 a the Chief Juithed
himself held they did in the Borden case.
Lastly. In the Borden case he took the ground distinctly, that a
Court could not in any way revise the decision of the President,
that such a state of insurrection existed as would justify him in
making arrests of the insurgents; whereas a large portion of his
opinion in the Merryman case consists of a labored effort to show
that the decision of the President was not supported by the situation of Maryland at the time. If he gave the opinion of the Court
correctly in the Borden case, he, as a Judge, had nothing to do with
that question. If the President had acted erroneously, it was like
an erroneous decision of the Supreme Court in a matter within its
exclusive jurisdiction. If he acted corruptly, he would be liable to
be impeached. In either case, in the language of the Chief Justice,
7 How. 45, "the Courts must administer the law as they find it."
But if it had been an open question, the circumstances fully justified
the arrest. Johnston was advancing with a rebel army, to take
Washington. Merryman aided the advance of this army a hundred times as much by preventing the approach of the United
States troops, as he would have done by joining Johnston's army.
If the President, then, could send a military force to capture Johnston, why not to capture Merryman? But the Chief Justice says
the civil authorities in Maryland had not been applied to. But
they knew what had occurred, and had not acted, and how long was
the President to wait for them? The civil authorities in Virginia
had not been applied to before the President sent an army to capture Gen. Johnston, and it would have been as idle to have attempted
to indict Merryman as Gen. Johnston.
The manifest inconsistencies between the opinions of the Chief
Justice in the two cases, can be rationally accounted for only on
the supposition that, in the excitement of the moment, the Borden
case had escaped his recollection. Fortunately the President, by
following the principles of that case, has been able, so far, to support
the Constitution.
Congress appears to have taken the same view of the subject, for
notwithstanding the publication of the decision in the Merryman
case, and although many of the members are eminent lawyers, no Act
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formally suspending the writ of habeas corpus has been passed, and no
power has been conferred on the President differing from that contained in the Act of 1795. Indeed, the fatal consequences which
would result from carrying into practical effect the doctrine "that
no argument can be drawn from the necessities of Government for
self-defence in times of tumult and danger," are so apparent, that
the promulgation of it, even from high authority, is productive of no
injury. It is like the attempt mentioned by Blackstone, to indict
surgeons, under the law of Bologna, against shedding blood in the
streets. There would be quite as much propriety in a court martial ordering a soldier to be shot for removing a wounded comrade
from a burning building, in violation of a strict order not to remove
him under any circumstances. To deny to the General Government the power of self-preservation, would be to disregard a principle that pervades the whole law, and which is the governing rule
in the construction of every statute and constitution- Ut res margis valeat quam. pereat.
For what purpose is such a strict construction to be applied to
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus ? It should be done,
it is said, to preserve the rights of the people. But those rights
depend on the Constitution. It would be a strange way of preserving
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to so construe the Constitution as to cause its loss. If the Constitution is destroyed, of
what use is the privileges.
One consideration seems to have been overlooked in these discussions regarding habeas corpus. What right has any one to the
privilege but a loyal citizen? Why should any one trouble himself
to secure to a rebel a franchise under a Constitution which he is
endeavoring to destroy? By his rebellion he loses his rights of
property; why not his rights of liberty ? Who but a rebel would
extend to a rebel the benefit of a writ which might restore him to a
situation in which he could do further mischief ?
One decisive objection to the decision in the Merryman case is,
that if its doctrines were carried into full effect, Secession would
become easy and sure. If the President can use no force except in
aid of the judicial power, Secession, however unconstitutional,

